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Executive Targeting of Congressmen as a
Violation of the Arrest Clause
Federal law enforcement has expanded to give the executive branch po-
tent new weapons for investigating crime.' These new techniques, includ-
ing undercover activity and surveillance, have created an unprecedented
potential for abuses that not only endanger the constitutional rights of
private citizens, but may threaten the balance of power between the exec-
utive and Congress.
"Executive targeting," as described in this Note, refers to the deploy-
ment of law enforcement power against a congressman with intent to dis-
credit him, and without prior reasonable cause to suspect that he has com-
mitted a crime.2 "Legitimate law enforcement," on the other hand, takes
place when the executive suspects that a crime has occurred and deploys
the law enforcement power to investigate that crime. Targeting first iden-
tifies a victim and then discovers his offenses; legitimate law enforcement
first discovers an offense and then seeks to find out whether the actor is
criminally responsible.' Although the executive can target any adversary,
1. Responsibility for early federal law enforcement was confined mainly to the United States mar-
shals, the Capitol police, and the Coast Guard. B. REKTOR, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
cIES (passim) (1975). Prohibition and the resultant rise in organized crime expanded federal law
enforcement. L. DODD & R. SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 29 (1979). See
also Note, The Scope of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Commerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.
F. 805, 806-07 (invention and success of automobile an impetus toward expanding federal criminal
jurisdiction).
2. The "reasonable cause to suspect" standard is less stringent than the "probable cause" required
for the issuance of warrants under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,
612-13 (1977). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968) and United States v. Mejia, 720
F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1983) (distinction between probable cause and reasonable suspicion).
This Note intends such male-specific words as "congressman" and "middleman" to be read as
gender-neutral. Alternative terms seemed cumbersome or unclear.
3. Justice Robert Jackson, while serving as U.S. Attorney General, discussed the difference be-
tween the two actions:
In such a case it is not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking
for the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the
lawbooks, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm ...
that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power lies.
R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor (1941) (available at Yale Law School library).
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the constitutionally determined tension between the executive and legisla-
tive branches4 makes congressmen uniquely vulnerable targets of abuse of
the law enforcement power.
Current interpretations of constitutional law do not adequately protect
congressmen from executive targeting. This Note argues that the constitu-
tional privilege from arrest 5 should provide such protection. Modern con-
stitutional law does not recognize the urgent relevance to executive target-
ing of the concern embodied in the arrest clause: preventing pernicious
executive intrusion into the legislative branch.
To address the threat of intrusion, this Note proposes legislation to cre-
ate special judicial oversight of all criminal investigations involving mem-
bers of Congress.' Before initiating such investigation, the executive
should be required to show to a judicial tribunal a reasonable suspicion of
past criminal conduct. Judicial preclearance of investigations involving
congressmen would honor the specific separation of powers mandate
found in the arrest clause, while respecting at the same time the needs of
legitimate law enforcement.
I. EXECUTIVE POWER TO TARGET CONGRESSMEN
An executive branch official wishing to target a congressman can em-
ploy law enforcement power that is now deeper and broader than in ear-
lier years. The modern executive official has more law to enforce, and
more sanctions at his or her disposal, than the original theorists of tripar-
tite government foresaw.7 The federal law enforcement bureaucracy also
has grown in prominence and power. Expanding budgets,8 new technol-
4. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("Ambi-
tion must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the consti-
tutional rights of the place."); see also J. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 340 (1956)
(President and Congress in "conflict artfully contrived and institutionalized by the Framers of the
Constitution.").
5. "The Senators and Representatives. . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach
of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the Same .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
6. A similar proposal is discussed in Wilson, The Real Issues in Abscam, Wash. Post, July 15,
1982, at A19, col. 2 (establishing judicial panel to review certain law enforcement investigations con-
cerning Congress with reasonable suspicion standard); cf. Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YALE L.J. 994, 1017-18 (1967) (statutory framework for prior judicial control of undercover
activity).
7. See Conboy, Federal Criminal Law, in 1 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835-1935, at 295,
301 (1937) (federal criminal jurisdiction originally narrow because of fear of usurpation of states'
powers); see also Note, supra note 1, at 805 (few constitutional grants of law enforcement power to
national government). For a discussion of the development of substantive federal criminal law, see
McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code,
1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 672-85.
8. The budget for fiscal year 1985 raised the Department of Justice's law enforcement budget by
3% to a total of $3.5 billion. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1985, at 5-142, 5-143 (1984). Most of the increase was sched-
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ogy,9 and the general expansion of federal agencies provide the executive
with the tools for targeting.10 Even though the President, insulated by a
circle of loyal subordinates and immunity from personal damage actions,"
may choose not to target, other powerful members of the executive branch
acting to fulfill either their personal agendas or the President's wishes can
use their executive power to harm adversaries. 2
These adversaries are more likely to be congressmen than private citi-
zens. Whereas enmity between the executive and ordinary citizens arises
only under special circumstances, political conflicts and the presidential
ambitions of many congressmen make it likely that the executive branch
will have adversaries in Congress. Executive targeting of congressmen
uses institutional powers to seek advantage in institutional conflicts.' 3
uled to be spent on criminal justice, especially the hiring of new law enforcement agents, an expansion
of local prosecutors' offices, and new prison construction. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
9. For example, the Department of Justice recently purchased for the FBI a new fingerprint
identification system and a $91 million radio scrambler. See N.Y. Times, supra note 8. The most
significant statutory recognition of the strength of technology in law enforcement is the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act's requirement that a judicial warrant be obtained before wiretapping may
take place. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982).
10. The Internal Revenue Service was used by at least two presidents to harass political enemies.
See J. LUKAS, NIGHTMARE: THE UNDERSIDE OF THE NIXON YEARS 22-26 (1973) (President
Nixon's use of IRS against alleged radicals); G. BENSON, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 151
(1978) (President Roosevelt's use of federal tax indictments of Senator Huey Long). For an account of
Roosevelt's conflicts with Senator Long, see J. BURNS, supra note 4, at 210-15.
President Nixon's abuses of the executive power are well documented. See Articles of Impeachment,
H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); W. SHANNON, THEY COULD NOT TRUST THE
KING (1974). The White House's infamous "enemies list," prepared in 1971, included 28 congress-
men, among them Senators William Fulbright, Edward Kennedy, Walter Mondale, Edmund Muskie,
and Representatives Bella Abzug, Father Robert Drinan, and the entire black membership of the
House of Representatives. L. CHESTER, WATERGATE 81, 269 (1973).
11. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982) (absolute presidential immunity from suits for
damages predicated on official acts); cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (absolute immu-
nity available also to presidential aides, if suit predicated on aides' exercise of discretionary authority
in sensitive matters); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (qualified immunity for federal execu-
tive officials). Actions for libel are not available to congressmen injured by the harmful publicity of an
indictment. See Marshall, 2 Scandals, Not 1, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1980, at A23, col. 1.
12. J. Edgar Hoover, in particular, served both his own ambitions and those of other executive
branch members through the FBI's law enforcement power. When Robert Kennedy wanted to secure
evidence to convict Jimmy Hoffa of crimes, Hoover deployed the FBI to keep Hoffa under continuous
surveillance. See V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 400, 404-10 (1970). Out of his personal hostility,
Hoover ordered electronic surveillance of Martin Luther King, Jr. See id. at 137, 153-55. Hoover
seldom turned the FBI's power on congressmen to gather evidence for prosecution. See Wilson, The
Changing FBI-The Road to Abscam, 59 PUB. INT. 3, 3 (1980). Yet Hoover remained useful to
targeting efforts. For example, President Johnson urged him to suggest on national television that
Senators Fulbright, Morse, Robert Kennedy, Gruening, Clark, and Aiken, who had visited the Soviet
embassy, were linked with espionage activity. See W. SULLIVAN, THE BUREAU 64-65 (1979). John-
son also requested that the FBI find derogatory information about Senator Fulbright, who had at-
tacked Johnson's policies. Id. at 235.
13. Arguably, a president's vendettas against congressmen have less to do with their status as
congressmen than with their personalities or their potential as rival presidential candidates. In this
view, Nixon's targeting of congressmen does not differ analytically from, for example, the White
House's attempt to smear Daniel Ellsberg by planting a copy of the Pentagon Papers at the Soviet
Embassy. See W. SHANNON, supra note 10, at 24-28 (recounting Ellsberg incident). This view over-
looks two key distinctions. First, the persons targeted cannot be severed from their occupations and the
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A. The Consequences of Congressional Vulnerability
Aimed specifically at congressmen, targeting violates the institutional
independence of Congress. It taints the integrity of the entire institution,
weakening Congress' ability to take the leadership role in setting policy
that the Constitution envisions.14 Targeted congressmen cannot effectively
represent their constituents or participate in the legislative process. Execu-
tive targeting simultaneously reduces representation and the legitimacy of
institutional action by Congress as the elected assembly of all the people.
Effective undermining of Congress, of course, depends on a public per-
ception of the results of targeting. The newsworthiness of allegations of
congressional wrongdoing creates unfavorable publicity, which no subse-
quent adjudication and quashing can entirely erase. 5 A mere indictment
may cost a congressman his job and his future career in politics.16
attendant power and visibility. Second, the targeting of a congressman spreads detrimental effects to
others, particularly constituents and Congress itself, whereas the targeting of individuals does not
attack the institution of legislative representation.
14. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1981, at B8, col. 3 (Representative Robert Livingston's statement
that "[tihe allegations that have hit the press [in regard to Abscam] represent an indictment of the
entire Congress"). The broad policy-setting powers of Congress enumerated in the Constitution are
found in art. I, § 8 (general powers, including necessary and proper clause); art. IV, § 3 (admitting
new states into Union and controlling territories); art. V (role in ratification of constitutional amend-
ments); and amendments XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII, XXIV and XXVI (passage of legislation
appropriate to secure individual rights).
15. For criticism of the prejudicial effect of publicizing decisions to prosecute, see Marshall, supra
note 11 ("If our representatives in Congress . . .willingly accept bribes for even ambiguous favors,
they should be prosecuted with vigor and impartiality, but it is grossly unfair-it is outrageously
unlawful, unprofessional and unconscionable-for the prosecutions to be commenced by leaks to the
press. . . ."); Freedman, Discipline an Errant Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1984, at A15, col. 2
("accused is convicted by publicity, without due process"); cf. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980, at Al, col.
1 (Senators Javits and Moynihan claim injuries to reputation after being mentioned in court as possi-
ble Abscam targets).
Senator Larry Pressler, upon the invitation of a middleman, attended a meeting where undercover
agents brought up the subject of a $50,000 contribution to Pressler's campaign fund in exchange for
his support of a private bill. Pressler refused to agree to the transaction. After considerable publicizing
of Pressler's having been approached for a bribe, FBI director William Webster sent Pressler a letter
of exoneration. The lingering taste of Pressler's experience prompted remarks from a Senate col-
league, Warren Rudman:
Senator Pressler will carry this for life. It is almost like someone who has been exposed to
radiation. The doctors tell them they are all right, but every day of their life they wonder if
something is eating away at them. Hardly a day has gone by . . . that Senator Pressler has
not at some point during the day on the floor come up and said something about: I hope that
maybe I can finally be cleared. And I said to him: Larry, you are dear, there is no question;
you have a letter, essentially, almost, I would say, of apology from the Director of the FBI.
But in his mind he was tainted.
FBI Undercover Operations: Report of the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. REP. No. 11, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
FBI Undercover Operations].
16. Most congressmen accused of corruption prevail if they reach the general election. Within this
category, however, bribery and morals charges result in more severe electoral retribution. Peters &
Welch, The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 74 AM.
POL. Sc. REv. 697, 703 (1980). Moreover, pre-election attrition takes place in the form of resigna-
tions, primary defeats and decisions not to run. Seventy-five percent of the congressmen accused of
corruption during the campaigns of 1968 through 1978 who reached the general election were re-
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Targeting exploits the executive power to command both publicity and
secrecy. Mistakes or failures of law enforcement action can be concealed,
and fruitful targeting announced. The best-documented category of execu-
tive targeting-monitoring and surveillance, where the executive orders
scrutiny of the target in the hope of learning damaging information-has
emphasized secrecy. 17 Yet the executive may also employ a new law en-
forcement technique, the undercover "sting operation,"'" for the benefits
of publicity that it can deliver.' Two sting operations resulting in prose-
cutions of legislators have received national attention. Despite approval by
courts 0 and observers,21 these enterprises point out a broad potential for
abuse.
As a result of the FBI sting operation known as Abscam,22 seven
elected, but only 62 percent survived the entire process. Id. at 702. See also Final Report of the Select
Comm. to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department ofJustice, S. RaP. No. 682,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 682-99 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Select Committee] (selected list of prosecu-
tions of congressmen, 1798-1981).
17. See, e.g., J. LUKAS, supra note 10, at 16-17 (surveillance of Senator Kennedy and housemates
of Mary Jo Kopechne after Chappaquiddick disclosure; Nixon memorandum to aide, Haldeman,
urging that "one of our best people" be assigned to "the Teddy Kennedy fight").
18. The Attorney General's guidelines on FBI undercover operations define an undercover opera-
tion as "any investigative operation in which an undercover employee is used"; an undercover em-
ployee is an employee of the FBI "whose relationship with the FBI is concealed from third parties in
the course of an investigative operation by the maintenance of a cover or alias identity." Attorney
General's Guidelines on FBI Undercover Operations, reprinted in Select Committee, supra note 16, at
536, 538. Undercover operations were uncommnon in federal law enforcement until after their suc-
cesses in Drug Enforcement Administration cases during the 1970's. Wilson, supra note 12, at 10.
The FBI did not expressly request funds for undercover activities from Congress until 1976. With $1
million appropriated for undercover activities in fiscal 1977, the FBI conducted 53 undercover opera-
tions. In fiscal year 1981 the FBI conducted 463 undercover operations with a specified appropriation
of $4.5 million. Select Committee, supra note 16, at 1. The FBI allotted $12,518,000 to undercover
work for fiscal year 1984. FBI Undercover Operations, supra note 15, at 12.
19. But see FBI Undercover Operations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 495, 496 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings] (statement of Philip Heymann, professor, Harvard Law School) (malicious execu-
tive would use investigative power rather than undercover operation).
20. See United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983);
United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982); United
States v. Murphy, 642 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). But see United States v. Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363, 374 (D.D.C. 1982),
rev'd, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983) (district court opinion, later
reversed, criticizing government conduct in Abscam), and United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp.
1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982)
(same).
21. See Etzioni, Worry More About Our Crooked Pols, Wash. Post, Sept. 19, 1982, at B1, col. 1
(sting operations necessary to law enforcement); Wilson, supra note 12. But see Glekel, A Case
Against Abscam, N.Y.LJ., Oct. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 2 (sting operations as threat to legislative indepen-
dence); McCarthy, BeyondJ. Edgar, NEw REPUBUC, Mar. 29, 1980, at 24 (attacking Abscam as
attempting "the business of purifying politics"); Saire, The Honesty Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1980,
at A23, col. 5 ("A new form of law enforcement is being tried. It's called 'the honesty test.' An FBI
man offers you some cash; if you turn it down, you go free. If you take the money, you are tried and
convicted on television the same night. It's a lot quicker and easier than the old jury system.").
22. The term is a contraction of Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., the fictitious business contrived by FBI
agents, and "scam," a slang expression meaning confidence game or swindle. United States v. Myers,
635 F.2d at 934 n.1.
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members of Congress were indicted and convicted on charges of bribery
and conspiracy to commit bribery, and forced out of office.23 Gamscam, a
sting operation conducted jointly by the FBI and the state of Washington's
Organized Crime Intelligence Unit, resulted in the conviction of two state
legislators.2 Neither Abscam nor Gamscam originated as sting operations
against the legislature: Abscam was devised to solve crimes involving se-
curities and art works,25 and Gamscam began as an inquiry into local
corruption in Vancouver, Washington.26 In both operations the metamor-
phoses into legislative sting operations remain obscure;27 in neither opera-
tion did the executive explain the transition. Exploring the question of
whether the executive branch had singled out certain congressmen for
bribe offers, the Senate select committee that investigated Abscam con-
cluded that no congressman who attended the FBI's videotaped meetings
had been chosen for a bribe unless a middleman had suggested his name.28
The committee did find that targeting activity nonetheless took place in
Abscam: An informant working with the Abscam agents exploited a mid-
dleman's innocuous reference to a congressman to justify the attempt to
bribe him.29 The committee also used the term targeting 0 to describe Ab-
23. Two charges common to all congressional defendants were bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c) (1982), and conspiracy to commit bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Representa-
tive Murphy was acquitted of bribery but convicted of taking an unlawful gratuity. Representative
Kelly's motion to dismiss on due process grounds was granted, but later reversed. United States v.
Kelly, 539 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1982), rev'd, 707 F. 2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
264 (1983). All other congressional defendants were found guilty of all major charges at the trial
level. Representative Kelly was defeated in the Republican primary; Representatives Jenrette, Mur-
phy, Myers, and Thompson were defeated in the 1980 general election. U.S. NEws & WORLD RE-
PORT, Nov. 17, 1980, at 39. Of the seven only Representative Lederer was reelected after indictment;
he resigned on May 5, 1981. Senator Williams resigned on Mar. 11, 1982. On Oct. 2, 1980, Repre-
sentative Myers became the first congressman in nearly 120 years to be expelled from the House.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1982 at B2, col. 4.
24. See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962
(1982).
25. Select Committee, supra note 16, at 401-04; see also id. at 83 ("[T]he record is unclear as to
why and on whose authority the focus of Abscam changed from an undercover operation aimed at
property crimes to one directed at political corruption").
26. See Bagnariol, 665 F.2d at 880.
27. See Select Committee, supra note 16, at 83; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Apr. 20, 1980, at I
(noting unclear transition).
28. Select Committee, supra note 16, at 13.
29. Id. at 57-66. For discussion of the possibility of law enforcement abuse involving middlemen,
see Note, Entrapment Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1122 (1982); Hearings,
supra note 19, at 638 (middleman as "unguided missile"); Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police
Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REv. 203, 286-91 (1975) (dangers of contingency-based compensation of
middlemen); Kotz, ABSCAM's Loose Cannons, NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 29, 1980, at 21 (unreliability
of middlemen).
30. See Select Committee, supra note 16, at 67-68. This Note uses the term "targeting" somewhat
differently from its use in the Select Committee report. As defined here, targeting must be done by the
executive branch; the Select Committee report, however, described as "targeting" the independent
behavior of Melvin Weinberg, who was not a member of the executive branch. Id. at 58-61. Interest-
ingly, the committee also considered "targeting of Congress as a group." Id. at 77-83. Although this
Note focuses on actions against individual congressmen, it makes the analogous argument that target-
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scam's focus on Democratic congressmen from New Jersey and Philadel-
phia. The two state legislators who were convicted in Gamscam also used
the term targeting to allege that the governor of Washington sought to
harm them because of their political aspirations."1
Undercover operations into a legislature highlight the inherent asym-
metry of targeting: The executive emerges as the moral crusader or law
enforcer, and the legislators appear, at best, merely to have escaped
guilt.32 This uneven result is acceptable if the operations arise in the
course of legitimate law enforcement. But if the operations arise from bad
motives of executive officials, then the result is unacceptable. It spreads a
ripple of reward for partisan hostility within the executive branch. Indi-
viduals who wield executive power can end a legislator's career, and Con-
gress can neither fend off nor entirely repair the damage.
B. The Failure of Safeguards
Because targeting uses the law enforcement power, against which con-
gressmen now have no special immunities, current safeguards against
abuse by the executive provide only those protections available to ordinary
citizens. These safeguards offer inadequate protection. They fail either be-
cause they are overbroad and cannot anticipate the specific details of
targeting, or because they provide an insufficient opportunity to prove
targeting. In any case, they cannot remedy a substantial portion of the
harm resulting from targeting.
1. Legislation Against Targeting
The power of Congress to enact legislation suggests the possibility of
either a prospective or a retrospective response, such as legislative hear-
ings, to the problem of targeting. But targeting eludes such responses. A
ing of individuals implicates the entire Congress. See supra pp. 649-50.
31. The two legislators were Gordon Walgren, majority leader of the state senate, and John
Bagnariol, speaker of the state house. Both men had made known their intentions to run political
races disfavored by the governor, Dixy Lee Ray: Bagnariol was to run against her in the next Demo-
cratic primary, and Walgren against her chosen candidate for state attorney general. See Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Apr. 20, 1980, at 1 ("Dixy Involved in FBI Sting?") and Apr. 16, 1980 ("Is the State
Patrol Dixy's Private Praetorian Guard?"). Walgren suggests that Governor Ray was able to involve
the FBI in Gamscam by exploiting Walgren's "political jousting" with the local U.S. Attorney. Letter
from Gordon Walgren to author (Dec. 13, 1983) (on file with the Yale Law Journal).
32. Several members of Congress, including Larry Pressler, see supra note 15, James Florio,
William Hughes, and James Howard, were approached by Abscam-employed middlemen and did not
accept bribe offers. Warner, The Troubling Ethics of Abscam, TIME, Feb. 18, 1980 at 21. The refus-
als, and the direct implication that congressional honor had been demonstrated, received very little
press coverage. Cf Marx, The New Police Undercover Work, 8 URB. LIFE 399, 413 (1980) (sug-
gesting that police undercover work, whatever its result, is immune from criticism: Proponents con-
tend that failure to apprehend criminals means that deterrent effect has forestalled crime, and success-
ful arrests serve to catch criminals).
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retrospective approach is forestalled by the divisive effect of targeting.
Once targeting becomes known, much of the damage is over, and each
congressman must confront the difficult individual decision of whether to
support or repudiate a publicly humiliated colleague. Legislative checks
require group action, but the range of individual reaction undermines the
cohesion and effectiveness of a collective response.3" The prospective ap-
proach-enacting legislation that prohibits targeting-is infirm in other
ways. First, since targeting is subsumed under law enforcement, a defini-
tion of bad motive precise enough for the federal code would prove diffi-
cult to formulate in advance. Second, even if laws against targeting could
be written, they would risk diminishing the public's estimation of congres-
sional integrity: Such laws might appear to insulate congressmen from the
federal criminal code. 4
The modified version of the protection-through-legislation approach
that Congress adopted in the late 1970's has not addressed adequately the
problem of targeting. These post-Watergate laws35 responded to the
targeting tactics used by President Nixon: income tax prosecutions,3 6 retri-
bution against whistleblowers, 7 and gathering of information.38 Future
33. Cf J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 270 (1980)
(noting contemporary justification for judicial review of separation of powers because "the President
can injure individuals by abusing the executive authority and . . . Congress, because of institutional
infirmities, cannot effectively prevent this.")
Part of the difficulty in searching for institutional safeguards against executive abuse lies in the
Framers' deep-seated fear of legislative abuse. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 310 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (legislative branch warrants especially careful concern, because it funds other
branches); T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120-21 (W. Peden ed. 1955) (Ist ed.
London 1787) (emphasizing threat of the legislature); see also Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 573, 603 (1984)
(constitutional convention arose out of practical and theoretical dissatisfaction with legislative
government).
34. Judges have suggested that Congress may indeed insulate itself through legislation. See United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524 (1972) ("[T]he Congress, of course, is free to exempt its Mem-
bers from the ambit of federal bribery laws .... "); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 939 (2d
Cir.) (Congress may redefine bribery offense to exclude acceptance of bribes offered to members by
undercover agents), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980). The obvious rejoinder-that Congress could
never actually enact such protective legislation, or even a lesser variant-suggests the need for a new
safeguard against executive abuse. The very nature of the legislative process often prevents legislators
from acting in their own interest. Constituent pressure and legislative accountability, though essential
checks on the behavior of the legislators, tend to steer Congress away from self-protecting measures.
These considerations may explain, for example, the occasional choice of congressmen not to vote for
salary increases but to raise members' compensation through liberal expense allowances and relaxed
rules for honoraria.
35. E.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982) (amended in 1974); Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat.
1824 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5 app., 18, and 28 U.S.C.); the whistleblower provisions of
the Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (1982); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,
12 U.S.C. § 3401-22 (1982); the tax information disclosure provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1982).
36. See NEW YORK TIMES, THE END OF A PRESIDENCY 46-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as END
OF A PRESIDENCY].
37. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1982) (civil servant fired after testifying about
overruns in Defense Department budget).
38. See END OF A PRESIDENCY, supra note 36, at 47-48.
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targeting could overcome the hurdles presented by these laws, because the
executive will always be able to abuse the legitimate law enforcement tac-
tics that remain available." Strengthening of the post-Watergate laws,
however, is likely to inhibit legitimate law enforcement by preventing ex-
ecutive use of valuable investigating techniques or undermining necessary
secrecy of operations.4"
2. Defenses of Law: Selective Prosecution and Entrapment
If the executive targets a congressman and subsequently brings crimi-
nal charges, the congressman may claim selective prosecution.41 In
cases of sting operations, a congressman may invoke the entrapment
defense as well.42 Both defenses have proved generally ineffectual in
practice;43 they pose certain conceptual problems as well.
39. Statutory specificity, when used to address the potential for abuse, tends to be reactive rather
than proactive. Because the contours of law enforcement cannot be foreseen, the executive needs dis-
cretion, and a policy of broad discretion cannot be reined in with requirements installed in memory of
old abuses. For the reverse side of this problem-the deleterious effect of specific curbs on law
enforcement-see infra note 40.
40. "Necessary secrecy" has long been recognized as an integral part of national government. Cf
Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (presidential intelligence
sources "are not and ought not to be published to the world"). It is difficult, however, to draw an
appropriate statutory balance between secrecy and safeguarding against abuse.
One attorney general, who served as the post-Watergate statutes began to take effect, has suggested
that these laws interfere significantly with law enforcement activity. The Freedom of Information Act
may discourage citizens from disclosing law enforcement information needed to prosecute a case; the
Tax Reform Act changes require Justice Department prosecutors to meet a difficult evidentiary bur-
den before tax information can be released; the Ethics in Government Act requires broad-scale federal
prosecution in situations that divert and may misallocate Justice Department resources. See Civiletti,
Post-Watergate Legislation in Retrospect, 34 Sw. L.J. 1043, 1047, 1049-50, 1053-56 (1981).
41. The origins of the selective prosecution defense lie in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373-74 (1886) (administrative regulation "applied and administered . . . with an evil eye and an
unequal hand" violates equal protection clause). Selective prosecution cases in the federal courts have
generally arisen in the context of draft resistance. Compare United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d
1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (draft resister entitled to hearing on selective prosecution claim) and United
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 618-20 (7th Cir. 1973) (same) with United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d
1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (no selective prosecution in enforcement of Selective Service registration require-
ment against vocal opponent of requirement), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (May 29, 1984). Analo-
gous defenses include bad faith prosecution, see Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972), and vindictive prosecution, see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-29
(1974); United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1980). Cf United States v. Margiotta,
688 F.2d 108, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (threat of
"federal prosecutors with largely unchecked power to harass political opponents"), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 913 (1983). For a comparative look at the normative foundations of the defense of selective
prosecution and its analogues, see Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 127, 131-35 (1983).
42. For recent discussions of the entrapment defense, see Duke, Entrapment Defense Languishes
in Permanent State of Confusion, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 30; Robinson, Criminal Law De-
fenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 236-39 (1982); Seidman, The Supreme Court,
Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 111.
43. See Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 Rtrr.-CAM.
L.J. 1, 6 (1974) (deference of judiciary to prosecutors); Duke, supra note 42 (entrapment defense too
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To raise a successful defense of selective prosecution, a defendant must
show selective enforcement of the law based on unjustifiable criteria.""
This defense addresses only one part of targeting-the prosecution-while
leaving initiation and manipulation of publicity unchecked. A recent case
involving prosecution of a congressman, United States v. Diggs,4 implied
that unless targeting is blatant enough to expose some unjustifiable crite-
ria before discovery, a court will not permit pretrial discovery on the
issue.46
The entrapment defense enjoys stronger support than does the defense
of selective prosecution, 47 but it too is unlikely to prevent the conviction of
a targeted congressman. Courts have interpreted the two Supreme Court
cases that established the defense48 to mean that entrapment exists only
when the defendant had not been predisposed to commit the crimes
charged.4  The Supreme Court's analysis, focusing on the state of mind of
the defendant rather than on the conduct of the police,5" provides little
incoherent to protect against targets of government investigations).
44. See Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the
Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88. Unjustifiable criteria, derived from Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 456 (1962), include arbitrary classifications such as race and religion. See also United States v.
Berrios, 501 F. 2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (adding "the desire to prevent [the defendant's] exercise
of constitutional rights" as unjustifiable criterion for selective prosecution defense). These criteria do
not reach the problem of targeting, and no congressman has ever prevailed with this defense.
45. 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
46. Representative Diggs supported his claim by arguing that the government had evidence of
similar violations of law by three other congressmen and yet did not prosecute them. In response, the
court stated that one of those congressmen, James Hastings, had indeed been prosecuted. Id. at
1003-04. (Representative Hastings had in fact been convicted before the appeal in Diggs. See United
States v. Hastings, No. 76-606 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1976).) See also United States v. Hansen, 566 F.
Supp. 162 (D.D.C. 1983) (prosecution, contemporaneous to Diggs, of congressman for ethical viola-
tions).) The Diggs court concluded that Representative Diggs had not shown sufficient unjustifiability
to warrant discovery on the allegation of selective prosecution. Accord, United States v. Shober, 489 F.
Supp. 393, 403-05 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (denial of evidentiary hearing in prosecution for bribery of
congressman).
47. The term "selective prosecution" may be deemed a tautology: Given limited prosecutorial
resources, prosecution by its nature must be selective. The entrapment defense, on the other hand,
reflects a view that "it is dangerous to give law enforcement officials limitless powers to tempt citizens
into criminality and then to punish those citizens for their criminal conduct." Select Committee, supra
note 16, at 369. The entrapment defense is recognized in every state, in the federal courts, and by the
Model Penal Code. Duke, supra note 42.
48. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369
(1958).
49. This test has come to be called the subjective standard, and remains the hornbook law of
entrapment. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 371 (1972). For defini-
tional problems with the term "predisposed," see Duke, supra note 42.
50. The police conduct test, also known as the objective standard, derives from the separate opin-
ions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453-59, and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman, 356
U.S. at 378-85. It is the law in some state courts and has been adopted by the Model Penal Code in
§ 2.13 (Official Draft 1962). See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373, 383 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978)
(Adams, J., dissenting). Academic critics generally prefer some form of an objective standard over the
subjective standard. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 167 n.13 (1976)
(collecting sources of commentary).
In a brief comment on the subject, Joseph Goldstein reexamines the subjective-objective dispute.
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protection to defendants.5 Moreover, modern entrapment claims often
cannot overcome the weight of videotape evidence. 52 A videotape shows
the defendant agreeing to commit the crime, omitting possible prior nego-
tiation or reflection that might indicate a lack of predisposition. 53
Congressmen can also raise their claims at legislative hearings that may
range from inquiries into narrowly defined wrongdoing to contemplations
of impeachment. 5" The impeachment sanction, however, is so drastic as to
be reserved in practice for only the most flagrant presidential abuse.55
Legislative hearings share with legal defenses the problem that they fail to
address the unique congressional vulnerability to indictment. By the time
a congressman has the opportunity to raise claims post hoc, the targeting
has done most of its work. 6
The prevailing view sees entrapment as a defense, but one "objective" response would perceive en-
trapment as an offense inflicted by law enforcement agents. Professor Goldstein argues that the latter
view derives from a premise that the law must protect the right of an individual to make choices free
from official coercion or deception. See Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human
Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 685, 687-88
(1975).
51. See Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565,
1581 (1982) ("[T]he defendant is said to be predisposed because he committed the act, and then is
held responsible for the act because he was predisposed. The pernicious circularity of this approach is
obvious.").
Suggestions that outrageous police conduct might bar conviction appear in Supreme Court dicta. See
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 493 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973). Yet the Supreme Court has always, and lower courts
have generally, adhered to the subjective standard. But see United States v. Twigg, 588 F. 2d 373, 377
(3d Cir. 1978) (conviction reversed, by divided panel, on ground that outrageous police conduct vio-
lated due process of law); Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968) (conviction
reversed on ground of governmental coercion).
52. None of the Abscam juries, which were presented with extensive videotape evidence, found
entrapment where defendants asserted the defense: United States v. Lederer (unreported), N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1981, § 1, at 36, col. 1; United States v. Jenrette (unreported), N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1980, at Al, col. 1. In United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 673 F.2d
578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), the district court's holding that defendants were
entitled to acquittal on entrapment grounds, 501 F. Supp. at 1193-1203, was reversed by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.
53. See Note, supra note 29, at 1138-39; see also Hearings, supra note 19, at 101-02 (suggestion
by lawyer-linguist that viewers' perceptions of videotape lead to bias against defendant because of
dark, murky quality of film, numbers shown upon image of defendant onscreen, and convincing simu-
lations of criminal personalities by surrounding undercover agents).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
55. See R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITuTIONAL PROBLEms 299 (1973) ("impeach-
ment of the President should be a last resort"); Linde, Replacing a President: Rxfor a 21st Century
Watergate, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 384, 385-89 (1975) (arguing that impeachment sanction is inef-
fective). This safeguard was used by the House of Representatives only once in American history:
Andrew Johnson was impeached in 1867 on the technical ground of defying the Tenure of Office Act.
R. BERGER, supra, at 252-60.
56. Cf. Sundquist, The Case for an Easier Method to Remove Presidents, 43 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 472, 477-79 (1975) (general failure of legislative and judicial checks to address executive abuse
until after damage is done).
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C. Targeting and Separation of Powers
The inadequacy of safeguards coupled with the expansion of targeting
power points out the unequal division of power between the executive and
legislative branches. Targeting, even absent the intent to debase an institu-
tion, divides and conquers Congress. The power imbalance breaches the
implicit mandate of the first two articles of the Constitution: a system of
interbranch checks, which facilitate both functional interdependence
among the branches and institutional independence of each branch.5"
Qualitative distinctions between the checks that protect and empower
each branch suggest the way in which targeting intrudes upon separation
of powers. The checks between branches vary not only in relative strength
but in the extent to which they fulfill the aims of separation of powers.
Checks in the spirit of separation of powers address institutional threats.
These checks are exercised openly and officially in a manner either out-
lined in the constitutional text or perfected over years of forthright and
principled use. Although the dividing line may be unclear, these checks
respond to policies and actions rather than to the people associated with
the activity. Checks at odds with separation of powers, on the other hand,
are aimed at human adversaries, harming institutions indirectly. They are
deployed in secret. They originate in personal battles, and the institutional
artillery used in these battles becomes forever altered by its abuse.58
When the executive wields its law enforcement power as an aggressive
57. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (Constitution "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reci-
procity"); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (branches "connected
and blended as to give to each one a constitutional control over the others"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-16 (1978) (describing theory of interdependence and independence).
Professor Tribe describes a model of American constitutional government that requires the coopera-
tion of at least two branches before any final governmental action affecting individual rights can take
place. Id. at 16. Executive targeting violates this principle, if one accepts the premises of this Note:
Subsequent judicial vindication of a targeted congressman cannot undo the finality of harm, see supra
text accompanying note 56, and targeting eludes all ex ante sanctions that the judiciary may provide.
Despite Congress' institutional failure to develop potent safeguards against executive abuse, its disap-
proval of targeting is also assumed. See supra p. 653.
58. In trying to draw a dividing line between the two checks one might ask: Can you fix it when
it breaks? Institutions can resist and recover from abuse far better than individuals. Consider the
following two examples of institutional checks, with the caveat that the individual-institutional dichot-
omy is not rigid, see text accompanying notes 57-59, but rather a preliminary distinction to help
isolate conduct that ultimately threatens the institution of Congress. An example of an executive check
upon the legislature that accords with separation of powers is the presidential veto. See U.S. CONST.,
art. I, § 7. Like any check, of course, the veto is susceptible to abuse; a president could reject a bill out
of rancor toward its sponsor. But the open nature of the veto, the prospect of an override, and the
force of interest groups that favor passage of the bill-all institutions of a sort-create powerful pro-
tection. A converse institutional check upon the executive branch is the power of Congress to impeach
the President. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 and art. II, § 4. The collective mobilization required for an
impeachment negates the force of private agendas and individual hostility. For a thoughtful inquiry
into this subject in light of the Nixon experience, see J. LABOvITZ, PRESIDENTIAL INMPEACHMENT
(1978).
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check against the other branches, the check becomes a potential weapon
that further skews the balance of institutional powers. The executive, and
no other branch, is authorized to use force, money, and personnel to en-
force the law, with a wide swath of discretionary power behind it. 9 Con-
gress, and no other branch, is composed mainly of politically accountable
individuals, a composition essential to the institutional enterprise.60
Institutional independence cannot exist without protection of individual
rights."' When institutional needs shape these rights into a zone of protec-
tion reserved to members of an institution, the rights take other names:
life tenure, immunity, privilege.6 2 Separation of powers mandates an ap-
propriate, active protection of this kind for each branch. Unlike members
of the other branches, however, congressmen currently find their constitu-
tionally based individual protection unduly circumscribed.
II. THE ARREST CLAUSE: A REEXAMINATION
The Supreme Court has never considered an allegation of executive
targeting of congressmen as a breach of separation of powers. A specific
separation of powers protection emerges, however, from analysis of the
arrest clause of the Constitution. The history of the arrest clause shows
that the very concept of separation of legislative and executive powers
originated, in part, in the rise of privilege for members of Parliament
from executive intrusion.
59. One might argue that the size of the executive branch expands vulnerability as well as power.
The actual size of the executive branch is a matter of some uncertainty. Ever since Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (President's power to remove officers of independent agencies
may be restricted), commentators have described the administrative agencies as a separate branch. See,
e.g., Strauss, supra note 33 (analyzing relationship of administrative agencies to President and Con-
gress). Questions of whether administrative agencies form a branch and whether their size somehow
increases executive-branch vulnerability are largely irrelevant to a discussion of the executive's power
to target congressmen. Administrative officials, unelected and in most instances anonymous to the
public, do not share the vulnerabilities exploited in targeting: media scrutiny, potential harm at the
polls, and the continued burden to demonstrate integrity.
60. Congressional bureaucracy, although smaller than that of the executive branch coupled with
the independent agencies, expands the vulnerability of each congressman. Inasmuch as a particular
staffer may be linked to a particular congressman, the potential to target that staffer amounts to the
potential to targeting of the congressman. Congressional staffing has mushroomed in recent years. In
1930, there were 280 staff members working for individual senators and 870 working for individual
House members; in 1976, there were 3,251 personal staff members in the Senate and 6,939 in the
House. H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN
LAWMAKING 171 (1977).
61. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (executive privilege protects "the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties").
62. See id. ("privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers"). Significant examples of
immunities include those of judges and executive officials for actions taken in the course of official
duties. See supra note 11. Such immunities have long been recognized, despite the absence of explicit
constitutional support. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498-99 (1896).
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A. Historical Dichotomy of Legislative Privilege
The arrest clause derives from English parliamentary privilege.13
Throughout its history in both England and America, privilege has served
two purposes: to protect the legislator against harassment and legal action
instituted by fellow citizens, and to protect all legislators against encroach-
ments from the executive branch. These dual protections of privilege oscil-
lated in importance. When the monarch attempted to intrude into the leg-
islature, Parliament deployed its privilege as a shield; in times of more
peaceful interbranch relations, the private protection dominated. Both in-
vocations of privilege helped to establish Parliament as a body indepen-
dent from the monarch, yet sharing authority over the populace.
Until the middle of the sixteenth century, Parliament's legislative func-
tion had not begun to dominate over its role as a judicial council and
advisory body. 4 Privilege, then, served more as a blessing of safe con-
duct 6 5 than as a source of legislative independence. Parliament invoked
privilege during the fifteenth century to release members and their ser-
vants from custody.6 8 While not yet opposed to the executive, this use
reflected a growing view of privilege as a source of independent power.
Sixteenth-century privilege remained, in the view of the majority of
Parliament, a perquisite based on status. One member of the House of
Commons, Peter Wentworth, made the revolutionary assertion that privi-
lege protected freedom of debate.6 1 Explicitly rejected by the rest of the
House, 8 this view of parliamentary privilege nevertheless first demon-
63. See Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 438 (1908).
64. For a discussion of the development of Parliament, see R. Burr, THE POWER OF PARLIA-
MENT 31-59 (1967).
65. See T. MAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS AND USAGE OF PARLIA-
MENT 102 (12th ed. 1917); 2 J. REDLICH, THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 153
(1908).
66. See C. WiTTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE 33 (1970) (dis-
cussing release of member's servant upon claim of privilege in Cheddre's Case (1404)). In Ferrers'
Case (1543), Commons for the first time delivered a member from custody upon its own authority. 1
J. HATSELL, PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 53-57 (2d ed. London
1785); Neale, The Commons' Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament, in 2 HISTORICAL STUDIES OF
THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT 147, 156 (E. Fryde & E. Miller eds. 1970).
67. In his challenge to the Commons, Wentworth inquired "whether free speache and free do-
inges, or dealinges be not graunted to euerye on of the parliament howse by lawe," and "whether it be
not an Iniurye to the whole state, and against the law, that the prince or priuie councell should send
for any membre of this howse in the parliament tyme, or aftre the end of the parliament . ... "
Neale, Peter Wentworth, in 2 HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, supra note 66,
at 246, 258.
68. When Wentworth announced his challenges to the House, Commons stopped his further pro-
ceeding "out of a reverend regard for her majesty's honour." SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 369 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham eds. 1937). The House then ordered Wentworth sent to
the Tower. Neale, supra note 67, at 259.
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strated the enduring link between individual privilege and separation of
powers.69
Wentworth's innovative view gained more approval among legislators
in the seventeenth century, 70 when the Stuart kings James I and Charles I
responded to their adversaries in Parliament with what might fairly be
termed executive targeting. 71 One tactic was known as "pricking for sher-
iff." Since a sheriff could not serve in Parliament, the Stuart kings were
able to curtail opposition to the monarchy by appointing political enemies
in Commons to be sheriffs in the hinterland. 2 In several dramatic inci-
dents, culminating in the beheading of Charles I in 1649, Parliament bat-
tled both kings over the question of supremacy.73 With no written consti-
tution, Parliament relied on tenets of privilege to support its assertion of
independence."
After the English constitutional crisis had abated, privilege shifted back
to providing insulation only from private citizens,'75 protecting against im-
pleader, subpoenas, jury service, and actions for seizure of goods brought
under the common law.76  During the internally tranquil reign of the
Hanovers, Parliament began to trim its privileges through legislation 77
69. See 3 P. HASLER, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1558-1603, at 598 (1981) (Wentworth's view
"a novel and revolutionary conception, without historical justification" in English constitutional
analysis).
70. Foreign affairs had dominated the national attention under Elizabeth; once the major foreign
questions were resolved, those of a constitutional nature came to the forefront. See J. TANNER, EN-
GLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1603-1689, at 5-7 (1966).
71. But see E. WINGFIELD-STRATFORD, KING CHARLES AND THE CONSPIRATORS at ix (1937)
(suggesting that Charles was victim of "a revolutionary conspiracy, pursued with an entire lack of
scruple").
72. See C. WrrrE, supra note 66, at 38; see also J. TANNER, supra note 70, at 56-57 (quoting
king's counselor, Sir Benjamin Rudyerd: "The rank weeds of Parliament are rooted up, so that we
may expect a plentiful harvest the next.").
73. For a contemporary account of King James's breaches of privilege, see THE PARLIAMENTARY
DIARY OF ROBERT BOWYER 1606-1607, at 15, 35, 99-100 (D. Willson ed. 1931). James asserted
that privilege existed by sufferance of the throne; Commons, in their Protestation of December 18,
1621, replied that privilege was theirs by "ancient and undoubted birthright." F. MATLAND, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 243 (1908). Parliament's struggle with King Charles is
detailed in I J. HATSELL, supra note 66, at 145-50; H. HULME, THE LIFE OF SIR JOHN ELIOT
(1957); J. TANNER, supra note 70, at 51-67. The most dramatic conflict occurred in January 1642,
when King Charles stormed Parliament, demanding the surrender of five members whom he accused
of treason. See M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 1 (1943).
74. Parliament eventually proclaimed "pricking for sheriff" a breach of privilege in 1765. C.
WITTE, supra note 66, at 38.
75. For accounts of insulating uses of privilege in this period, see 10 W. HOLDSWORTH, A His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAw 544-45 (1938); 1 E. PORRITT, THE UNREFORMED HOUSE OF COMMONS
571 (1903) ("[MIen procured election to the House in order that they might evade their creditors, and
keep outside the debtors' prisons"); C. WrrrKE, supra note 66, at 39 (traffic in forged "protections,"
which identified bearer as servant of member of Parliament and served to stop all actions at law).
76. 0. WILSON, A DIGEST OF PARLIAMENTARY LAW 237-38 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1869).
77. Parliament abolished "protections," see supra note 75, in 1718. See 10 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 75, at 545 n.9 (declaration that all protections were void, and imposing on members of
Commons who issued them obligation to make satisfaction to injured parties). In 1770 the Parliamen-
tary Privilege Act, 10 Geo. 3, ch. 50, sharply curtailed privilege. T. MAY, supra note 65, at 106.
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and general disuse."8 The American colonial governments were estab-
lished in this period. Physically distant from an independent executive and
influenced by the dormant phase into which English parliamentary privi-
lege had entered, the American legislative assemblies did not need, and
therefore did not establish, privilege as an adversarial safeguard. 9 This
was the context, then, in which the Framers of the Constitution contem-
plated legislative privilege.
B. The American Imperative
On August 20, 1787, the constitutional convention determined that leg-
islative privilege would be part of the Constitution. 0 The Framers, who
both hated monarchical supremacy and feared legislative power of an "en-
croaching nature,""1 decided to include in the Constitution a privilege that
was at the time firmly based on status. Given the prevailing sentiment
that no person was entitled to special perquisites that did not enhance the
function of government, this decision suggests that the Framers believed
that a threat from the executive might emerge.
1. An End to Dichotomy
By expressing the separateness of the legislature with respect to free-
dom from arrest and freedom of debate, the privileges clause comes closer
than any other textual provision to a constitutional affirmation of institu-
tional integrity as mandated by separation of powers.8" Legislative privi-
These reforms resulted from a widespread view that privilege had been abused. For examples of
extreme applications of privilege, see supra note 75; see also 1 J. HATSELL, supra note 66, at 132
(paternity suit against servant of member of Parliament deemed breach of privilege); 10 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 75, at 545 n.7 (breach of privilege to kill "rabbits from the warren of Lord
Galway a member").
78. See C. WiTTKE, supra note 66, at 203 (reforms of nineteenth century, increased representa-
tiveness, and solidification of power within Commons created climate where "sweeping claims of priv-
ilege were no longer so necessary to protect [Commons] in the exercise of its legislative activities, and
to guard it against encroachments from Crown, Lords, and courts").
79. See M. CLARKE, supra note 73.
80. See 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 340-41 (rev. ed.
1966). Legislative privilege had been part of the Articles of Confederation as well:
Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court
or place out of Congress: and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from
arrest and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and attendance in,
Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. 5, para. 5, reprinted in M. JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 264 (1940).
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
82. Cf United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491 (1979) (purpose of speech or debate clause
"to preserve the constitutional structure of separate, coequal, and independent branches of govern-
ment"); Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734, 738 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (speech or debate clause only
explicit constitutional provision of separation of powers).
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lege is a force for equality between branches, not superiority of congress-
men over their fellow citizens.
Proffered constructions of legislative privilege, however, have obscured
its constitutional significance. Two Supreme Court cases squarely discuss
the arrest clause.8" Williamson v. United States8 4 held that arrest for any
criminal charge falls under the clause's exemptions from immunity: trea-
son, felony, and breach of the peace.8 5 Long v. Ansell,88 a short Brandeis
opinion, determined that congressmen are not immune from civil pro-
cess. 87 Because Williamson ended immunity from all criminal arrests and
Long ended immunity from the modern vestige of civil arrest,88 the arrest
clause now provides no shelter from legal sanctions. Williamson and Long
properly have discredited one half of the privilege dichotomy-immunity
from the law. Yet because they do not pertain to executive abuse, they do
not diminish the clause's historical and constitutional role.
Williamson, the Supreme Court's only discourse on the history of the
arrest clause, relied strongly on the works of political and legal historians
who argued for the importance of privilege,' and then reached a verdict
narrowing its protection. By contemplating the constitutional argument
and then ruling against exempting congressmen from the law, Williamson
has left open an alternative category not impugned by Representative
Williamson's harking back to the abuses of his legislative ancestors. Like-
wise Long, which did not adjudicate executive action, did not foreclose
grounding the protection of certain constitutional needs in the arrest
clause. Although privilege as perquisite fulfills no constitutional goal,
privilege as freedom from executive intrusion remains to be examined by
the Supreme Court.
Speech or debate clause decisions9" reflect an effort to construe privilege
83. In Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 (1905), the Supreme Court used the arrest clause as
a ground for jurisdiction, but declined to interpret it.
84. 207 U.S. 425 (1908).
85. Id. at 438-43. Williamson, a member of Congress, was arrested for conspiring to suborn
perjury. He argued that this indictment charged neither a felony, nor breach of the peace, nor treason,
and hence that his arrest was unconstitutional.
86. 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
87. For contemporary comment, see Note, Congressional Exemption from Suit and Responsibility
and the Long Case, 3 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 231 (1935).
88. The Judgements Act of 1838 had the effect of abolishing arrests in civil cases in England. K.
BRADSHAW & D. PRING, PARLIAMENT AND CONGRESS 94 (1972). The abolition of civil arrests in
the United States began somewhat later; these arrests continued into the twentieth century. See, e.g.,
Kalloch v. Elward, 118 Me. 346, 108 A. 256 (1919) (arrest for alienation of affections of plaintiff's
husband).
89. These included Blackstone, see Williamson, 207 U.S. at 439-40, Joseph Story, see id. at
443-44, and Luther Cushing, see id. at 444-45. It is not clear why the Williamson opinion discussed
at length the history of the arrest clause only to remand the case on procedural grounds. For discus-
sion of this choice, see J. DALY, THE USE OF HISTORY IN THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT:
1900-1930, at 79-80 (1954).
90. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 368-69 (1980); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S.
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as a source of legislative integrity and independence. Like Williamson and
Long, these decisions manifest at first a narrow view; they have been de-
scribed as emasculations of legislative privilege.91 Speech or debate claims
have failed as asserted bars to prosecution92 and as defenses to civil
claims.9" In the recent speech or debate cases, however, the Supreme
Court has presented its functional approach to legislative privilege. 94
Under this view, privilege is examined in terms of how it advances the
legislative enterprise. A privilege merely giving a congressman special ad-
vantage with regard to his or her legal obligations serves no functional
need. Thus, privilege may protect the legislative acts of a congressman's
aide,95 but not a congressman's promise to perform legislative acts.9 8 The
Supreme Court's holdings in both arrest clause and speech or debate
clause cases do not reject the clauses' protections, but rather begin the
process of eliminating the unneeded half of the privilege dichotomy.
2. Current Meaning and Function of the Arrest Clause
Viewed together, the arrest clause and the speech or debate clause ad-
dress executive targeting. Freedom of speech and debate epitomizes legis-
lative independence, the raison d'etre of privilege9" and of the legislature
itself. The speech or debate clause, however, can protect only part of that
independence. As interpreted, the speech or debate clause protects legisla-
tive acts only:98 It declares the right, but its protection ends with legisla-
111, 123-27 (1979); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 491-92 (1979); Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501-03 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-12
(1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501,
507-09 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S.
82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-82 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 372-73 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
91. See Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Speech or Debate: The New Interpretation
as a Threat to Legislative Coequality, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1019, 1067-69 (1974).
92. E.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (former senator convicted for taking
bribe even though conduct related to legislative acts); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 937 (2d
Cir.) (statute prohibiting bribery of members of Congress does not violate speech or debate clause),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
93. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
94. Cf Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972) ("prior cases have plainly not taken a
literalistic approach in applying the privilege").
95. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616-17. Although the Court found that Senator Gravel's aide shared his
constitutional immunities, the holding-that the speech or debate clause protection did not apply-has
led to criticism that the term "legislative acts" as interpreted by the Court excludes too much neces-
sary conduct and ultimately harms legislative independence. See Cella, supra note 91, at 1042-46 &
n.87; Ervin, The Gravel and Brewster Cases: An Assault on Congressional Independence, 59 VA. L.
REv. 175, 191 (1973).
96. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
97. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 182 (1966) (speech or debate clause designed
predominantly to prevent the instigation of criminal charges against "critical or disfavored legisla-
tors"); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (purpose of speech or debate
clause to protect integrity of legislative process by ensuring independence of individual legislators).
98. See Note, Evidentiary Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 1280, 1282
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tive business. 9 A broader interpretation risks covering congressmen with
blanket immunity. Unlike the arrest clause, moreover, the speech or de-
bate clause contains no temporal reference but limits its protection to the
chambers. It is written in absolute terms, without exceptions.1 00 These
traits, found in both the text and judicial interpretation, suggest that the
speech or debate clause contains the more unwavering and narrow of the
privileges. A separate safeguard must guard against executive attacks on
private activity.'01
The arrest clause answers the constitutional need for a safeguard
against executive attacks on individual legislators.10 2 Its textual contrast of
arrests that threaten legislative independence with those that are innocu-
ous parallels the difference between targeting and legitimate law en-
forcement. To a greater degree than the speech or debate clause,
the arrest clause speaks to executive action-at least since arrests in
civil cases were abolished-while the speech or debate clause pertains to
post hoc inquiry in a judicial forum. The history of freedom of speech
within Parliament is also shared by the arrest clause, as members of
Commons who asserted their freedom to speak were arrested and
confined to the Tower of London.10 3  History shows, moreover,
that freedom from arrest-the older'0" and more solidly accepted
(1979) ("distinction between protected legislative acts and unprotected nonlegislative acts . . . has
shaped substantive immunity under the speech or debate clause").
99. The Supreme Court has identified examples of conduct connected to legislative acts that is
unprotected by the speech or debate clause. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
(newsletters and Golden Fleece award, a "defamatory statement," was not protected because not "es-
sential to the deliberations of the Senate"); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (legisla-
tors often "cajole, and exhort" in relations with executive branch over administrative conduct, yet
these acts are not protected).
100. See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509-10 (1975).
101. One commentator, however, has argued for a broad and self-enforcing protection derived
from the speech or debate clause. See Celia, supra note 91; Celia, The Doctrine of Legislative Privi-
lege of Freedom of Speech and Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecu-
tions in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1968).
102. Early constitutional theorists recognized the relationship between the protection of individu-
als from arrest and the vigorous functioning of a representative body. As Justice Story observed, the
arrest privilege was for the benefit of
constituents, that they may not be deprived of the presence, services, and influence of their own
Representative in the national councils. It might otherwise happen, that he might be arrested
from mere malice, or from political persecution, or upon some unfounded claim, and thus they
might be deprived of his aid and talents during the whole session.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 93-94 (2d ed. New
York 1847). See also T. JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 17 (1872) (arrest
deprives constituents of their "voice in debate and vote").
103. See I J. HATSELL, supra note 66, at 145-46 (arrest by King Charles of adversaries in
Commons); F. MAITLAND, supra note 73, at 320 (arrest of Sir John Eliot, King Charles's leading
adversary in Parliament); W. NOTESTEiN, THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 1604-1610, at 501 (1971)
(Queen Elizabeth's practice of "sending to prison for a vacation (usually short) those whose utterances
dealt with matters that she believed to be her prerogative"); Neale, supra note 67, at 259 (arrest of
Peter Wentworth and others).
104. The precise chronological origins of both privileges are obscure. One historian dates the
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privilege' 05-has been amenable to meeting flexibly the needs of a legisla-
ture. Throughout its history the arrest privilege included freedom from
general molestation. General molestation, in constitutional terms, is analo-
gous to action that may never reach formal adjudication but whose early,
amorphous stages can harm a congressman and thereby threaten separa-
tion of powers. A protection against this potential for abuse should accord
with the needs suggested by the text and history of the arrest clause.
III. MONITORING LEGISLATIVE INTEGRITY
In the effort to locate the imperative of the arrest clause, a literalist
approach necessarily fails. The clause cannot say explicitly what privilege
should encompass, because the evil at which it is aimed-executive moles-
tation of a congressman outside the sphere of legislative acts-can dodge
whatever provisions appear in the text.1"6 For this reason, the clause has
been subject to continued reinterpretation throughout its life under mon-
archy, parliamentary supremacy, and American tripartite government. 10 7
The substance of the arrest clause seems mercurial because executive
targeting is elusive: Targeting and legitimate law enforcement differ only
in what impels the action, rather than in the action itself. Because of this
distinction, subtle yet of great importance to separation of powers princi-
ples, the arrest clause stands for a protection against the harmful effect of
executive motive.
The protections suggested by a historical reading of the arrest clause
should coexist, of course, with the executive's duty to enforce the law
against the members of the other branches. A modern application of legis-
beginning of privilege from arrest to the laws of Ethelbert, developed at the end of the sixth century.
T. MAY, supra note 65, at 102. The privilege was first codified in a statute of Henry IV. Reinstein &
Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1122 n.46
(1973). Wittke argues that privilege in general must be viewed to begin in the early fifteenth century,
when Parliament began to resemble a modem legislature. C. WrrTKE, supra note 66, at 33 n. 40. It
is clear, however, that the privilege from arrest predates freedom of speech and debate.
105. The early drafts of privilege provisions in the Constitution stated: "The delegates shall be
privileged from arrest (or assault) personal restraint during their attendance, for so long a time before
and after, as may be necessary . . . (and they shall have no other privilege whatsoever)." 2 M.
FARRAND, supra note 80, at 140 (emphasis in original). Later versions added the protection of free-
dom of speech and debate. See id. at 166.
106. Blackstone noted the infirmity of a literalist view:
Privilege of parliament was principally established, in order to protect its members not only
from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by
the power of the crown. . . . [If privilege were defined too narrowly] it were easy for the
executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under pretense
thereof to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of parliament.
1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *164.
107. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 369-70 (1980) (limits of application of English
history to American constitutional analysis); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507-08
(1972) (same); 2 J. WILSON, WORKS 35 n.2 (J. Andrews ed. 1896) (rejecting application of Black-
stone's view, see supra note 106, to American government).
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lative privilege should not vitiate robust protection against congressional
wrongdoing. Congress must protect itself against law enforcement abuse,
yet it must meet this need without compromising its collective honor.
Parliamentary history suggests that Congress should be the judge of its
own privileges.'" 8 In this view, Congress itself would fulfill the mandate
of the arrest clause, and provide a check against executive targeting. Vari-
ations of this approach range from the executive's being required to notify
the speaker of the House when beginning an intrusionl0 9 to having Con-
gress control virtually all law enforcement against its members."0 The
objection to this view is similar to the objection to targeting: Policing of
oneself-like the conjunction of the power to decide to investigate a politi-
cal adversary in Congress, indict, prosecute, and announce news stories of
one's actions-centralizes too much power and invites abuse."1  Ulti-
mately congressional self-monitoring would sacrifice institutional legiti-
macy at the altar of separation of powers.
Congress, then, should pass legislation delegating the protection of its
privileges to the judiciary. Delegation does not remove from Congress its
proper responsibility, but rather ensures optimal integrity of the check
against the executive. The judiciary is also uniquely competent to under-
take review of law enforcement action.
Under this proposal, a court of legislative integrity would review pro-
spectively" 2 all law enforcement action against congressmen. The panel
108. This concern is reflected in the early American discussions of legislative privilege. At the end
of the Congress of the Confederation in June 1777, the delegates resolved that Congress would have
authority to protect its privileges. L. CUSHING, LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES
221 n.1 (9th ed. Boston 1874); cf Note, Legislative Power to Punish Contempt, 3 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 468, 477-82 (1935) (rights of Congress to use coercion and sanctions). But cf. Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) (curtailing congressional authority to punish for contempt).
109. The historical endurance and flexibility of this idea is suggested by its reiteration through
centuries of the literature. Compare 2 J. HATSELL, supra note 66, at 259 (king who arrests member
of Parliament should promptly notify house leadership) with Penikett & Michael, Yukon Legislative
Assembly: Report of Special Committee on Privileges on Wiretapping of a Member's Telephone, PAR-
LIAMENTARIAN, Jan. 1982, at 51-56 (Royal Canadian Mounted Police must inform speaker when
installing wiretap; speaker's consent not needed). This approach is probably best suited to parliamen-
tary government, where the speaker of the house can provide a more direct and powerful safeguard
against law enforcement intrusion. See L. CUSHING, supra note 108, at 248 (Congress need not re-
ceive advance notice of arrest of member).
110. Professor Cella has argued for congressional control of law enforcement actions against its
members. See supra note 101; cf. United States v. Eilberg, 465 F. Supp. 1080, 1083 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(ethics committee, by disciplining member, exercises Congress' right to preserve its independence).
111. Congressional self-policing today takes place in the form of censures, denunciations, and, in
very rare cases, expulsions of members. Congress uses these measures so sparingly that only a few
errant members have felt their force: Between 1900 and June 1980, Congress censured or denounced
only nine members, see U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 23, 1980, at 61, even though one study,
see Peters & Welch, supra note 16, at 701, used a data base of 81 congressmen accused of corruption
between 1968 and 1978 alone. This reluctance suggests considerable infirmity in leaving ethical con-
trols solely in the hands of Congress.
112. For the dangers of allowing review to remain retrospective, see supra text accompanying
notes 14-15, 56. But cf. Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of En-
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would review action including, but not limited to, sting operations," 3 in-
come tax audits, physical surveillance, and surreptitious gathering of
information-intrusions into the private as well as the public lives of con-
gressmen. The court would infer hostility toward a particular congress-
man if the executive could not show reasonable suspicion that the con-
gressman had been engaging in criminal activity.
In addition, this proposal would not permit the executive to begin the
law enforcement action without the court's approval. It would also forbid
the executive from announcing that it had submitted a proposal to the
panel. Sanctions for violating this preclearance provision would be deter-
mined by Congress; they should include quashed prosecutions and a dam-
ages remedy.
Such preclearance is probably constitutional. Courts have approved
similar judicial oversight of law enforcement action created by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act." 4 A special constraint upon unchecked law
enforcement against congressmen does not break new ground in limiting
executive discretion and would not threaten separation of powers; separa-
tion of powers principles are reinforced, not imperiled, by this tripartite
check. 1 1
5
trapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 137, 173-74 (1963) (retrospective review suffi-
cient for entrapment cases).
113. The American Civil Liberties Union has argued, in an unpublished report, that sting opera-
tions directed at all citizens demand heightened scrutiny; the report characterized an undercover agent
as analogous to a hidden microphone and urged that the FBI be required to obtain a judicial warrant
before staging a ruse offering someone the opportunity to commit a crime. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1982,
at B9, col. 1. Although this suggestion was rejected by the Abscam select committee, see Select Com-
mittee, supra note 16, at 387-89, the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights has
recommended legislation that would require the FBI to obtain a judicial warrant before beginning an
undercover operation. See FBI Undercover Operations, supra note 15, at 83-85.
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1982). One district court has twice approved the constitutionality of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, a panel of federal district court judges who consider
government requests to use electronic surveillance in particular cases. See United States v. Megahey,
553 F. Supp. 1180, 1195 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1311,
1314-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); cf. United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(affirming conviction involving use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court where defendants as-
serted constitutional challenge). The court has operated in secret since its inception in May, 1979. As
of January, 1983, it had approved all 1,422 applications brought before it by the Justice Department
lawyers precleared to appear before it. See Peck, A Court That Never Says No, THE PROGRESSIVE,
Apr. 1984, at 18; see also Schwartz, Oversight of Minimization Compliance Under the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act: How the Watchdogs are Doing Their Jobs, 12 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 405, 435-36
(1981) (describing court's procedures). To establish the court of legislative integrity at minimal ex-
pense and administrative inconvenience, the judges currently serving on the F.I.S.C. could simply
assume legislative-integrity duties.
115. One commentator has encouraged Congress to use its legislative power to expand judicial
oversight. See 5 A. BOYAN, CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF WATERGATE 442-43 (1979) (Congress
should extend initiative begun in wiretap statute toward greater checks on executive activity); see also
M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURI" 13-16 (1977) (right of Congress
to expand judicial review of law enforcement activity).
The major difference between foreign intelligence surveillance and executive targeting is the addi-
tional political question difficulty raised by judicial oversight of executive-legislative relations. See J.
CHOPER, supra note 33, at 307-08 (judicial intervention as disincentive to settlement of political
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No sanction, of course, can entirely address the problem of targeting.
An executive determined to abuse the law enforcement power could ob-
scure its motive, investigate covertly before submitting the action for re-
view, or otherwise deceive the court. The court also would have to con-
sider multiple or conflicting motives held by individual members of the
executive branch. Faced with both bad motive and evidence of reasonable
suspicion, the court would have to balance the harm of condoning legisla-
tive wrongdoing against the harm of bolstering pernicious executive mo-
tive. These problems, although difficult, are amenable to case-by-case
scrutiny. Moreover, the experience of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court suggests that the creation of such judicial oversight might
have an independently healthy effect on both law enforcement and con-
gressional integrity. In any case, because executive targeting may damage
a congressman irreparably before formal adjudication takes place, the role
of the judiciary must not be limited to after-the-fact review.
CONCLUSION
The need for legislative privilege has not reached the point of the En-
glish constitutional crisis: There are no present-day analogues to King
Charles, combining sufficient power with sufficient hostility to the legisla-
ture. What do exist, however, are the dangerous powers of targeting and
their proven, if sporadic, use. A modest and precedented judicial safeguard
against the abuse of executive action toward a congressman can counter
the threat of targeting.
Without such a procedural safeguard, the philosophy behind the arrest
clause goes unsatisfied. The clause does not deliver to congressmen total
immunity from any form of executive molestation, but it also does not, as
some readers of Williamson might have thought, leave congressmen totally
vulnerable to arrest for any indictable offense. It offers instead a middle
path: freedom from pernicious executive intrusion, as determined by the
neutral third branch.
-Anita Bernstein
disputes between executive and Congress). But see M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS
AND HUMAN RIGHTs 54-57 (1982) (defense of interventionism in these disputes). See also Note, The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance,
78 MICH. L. REv. 1116, 1117 (1980) (collecting views of congressmen opposed to Act); id. at
1144-50 (although Act raises political question problems, Note concludes that Act does not violate
doctrine).
